“Measuring What Matters: Crime, Disorder, and Fear.” National Institute of Justice:
Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings, July 1999 (NCJ 170610),
p. 37-54.
This chapter considers two issues: 1) measuring the possible effects of an innovative policing program, and
2) doing so in a framework that could support the inference that the program caused variations that the
measurements might reveal. Measurement involves (among other things) the collection of data that
represent–sometimes only indirectly–the problems that programs target. These are “outcome” measures,
and it is vital that they represent the scope of a program’s intentions as accurately as possible. One cannot
divorce what is measured from how the measures can be linked causally to programs. What evaluators call
the “logic model” of a program–how, exactly, it is supposed to have its desired effect–needs to be specified
clearly enough that appropriate outcomes can be identified and their measures specified. For instance, if
evaluating a crime prevention program, exactly what kinds of crimes involving what kinds of victims during
what periods of the day or night should we examine for evidence of impact? This essay focuses on
measurement issues, but it addresses issues through concrete examples of how measures have been
used to make judgements about the impact of programs. It examines some of the experiences the
evaluation community has had in taking the vital signs of a community by measuring crime, disorder, and fear.
Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings, July 1999 (NCJ 170610),
p. 37-54.
This chapter considers two issues: 1) measuring the possible effects of an innovative policing program, and
2) doing so in a framework that could support the inference that the program caused variations that the
measurements might reveal. Measurement involves (among other things) the collection of data that
represent–sometimes only indirectly–the problems that programs target. These are “outcome” measures,
and it is vital that they represent the scope of a program’s intentions as accurately as possible. One cannot
divorce what is measured from how the measures can be linked causally to programs. What evaluators call
the “logic model” of a program–how, exactly, it is supposed to have its desired effect–needs to be specified
clearly enough that appropriate outcomes can be identified and their measures specified. For instance, if
evaluating a crime prevention program, exactly what kinds of crimes involving what kinds of victims during
what periods of the day or night should we examine for evidence of impact? This essay focuses on
measurement issues, but it addresses issues through concrete examples of how measures have been
used to make judgements about the impact of programs. It examines some of the experiences the
evaluation community has had in taking the vital signs of a community by measuring crime, disorder, and fear.
Reducing Fear of Crime in Houston and Newark. Washington DC: National Institute of
Justice/Police Foundation, February, 1986.
In cooperation with the police departments of Houston and Newark, and the active support of the National
Institute of Justice, the Police Foundation put to the test a variety of methods intended to reduce fear, improve
the quality of neighborhood life, and increase popular satisfaction with police services. The report that follows
summarizes those experiments. Among the concrete lessons of those experiments are these:
1) In Houston, where the population is growing rapidly, densities are low, and neighborhoods are new,
opening a neighborhood police station, contacting the citizens about their problems, and stimulating the
formation of neighborhood organizations where none had existed helped reduce the fear of crime and the
actual level of victimization. 2) The value of these organizing and communicating efforts seem to be greatest
for white, middle-class homeowners and least for black renters. This suggests that not every strategy works
equally well for every group. 3) In an older, more disadvantaged city such as Newark, many of the same steps
– including opening a storefront police office and directing the police to make contacts with citizens in their
homes – also had beneficial effects, especially when they were supplemented with aggressive efforts to
enforce the law and maintain order in those neighborhoods. 4) Police officers often resist being assigned to
making citizen contacts, running a storefront office, or organizing neighborhood meetings. “It’s not real police
work”, but in Houston and Newark that initial resistance soon gave way to enthusiasm when the officers
realized how receptive the citizens were, how much information the police thereby obtained, and how
appreciate most people were for the attention paid to their problems. 5) Helping citizens reduce their fear of
crime in ways that improve satisfaction with police services requires a proactive strategy–it is not enough to
respond to spontaneous requests for information, attend the meetings of groups already organized, or wait
for citizens to come to headquarters. There must be a positive outreach program designed to crate interest,
meetings, and inquiries. 6) Like all aspects of good police work, the community-contact strategy requires
careful planning, training, and supervision and the recruitment of able personnel. 7) Learning what works in
any city requires a commitment to the experimental method, in which a new tactic is tried in a way that permits
a systematic, unbiased evaluation of its outcome.
Justice/Police Foundation, February, 1986.
In cooperation with the police departments of Houston and Newark, and the active support of the National
Institute of Justice, the Police Foundation put to the test a variety of methods intended to reduce fear, improve
the quality of neighborhood life, and increase popular satisfaction with police services. The report that follows
summarizes those experiments. Among the concrete lessons of those experiments are these:
1) In Houston, where the population is growing rapidly, densities are low, and neighborhoods are new,
opening a neighborhood police station, contacting the citizens about their problems, and stimulating the
formation of neighborhood organizations where none had existed helped reduce the fear of crime and the
actual level of victimization. 2) The value of these organizing and communicating efforts seem to be greatest
for white, middle-class homeowners and least for black renters. This suggests that not every strategy works
equally well for every group. 3) In an older, more disadvantaged city such as Newark, many of the same steps
– including opening a storefront police office and directing the police to make contacts with citizens in their
homes – also had beneficial effects, especially when they were supplemented with aggressive efforts to
enforce the law and maintain order in those neighborhoods. 4) Police officers often resist being assigned to
making citizen contacts, running a storefront office, or organizing neighborhood meetings. “It’s not real police
work”, but in Houston and Newark that initial resistance soon gave way to enthusiasm when the officers
realized how receptive the citizens were, how much information the police thereby obtained, and how
appreciate most people were for the attention paid to their problems. 5) Helping citizens reduce their fear of
crime in ways that improve satisfaction with police services requires a proactive strategy–it is not enough to
respond to spontaneous requests for information, attend the meetings of groups already organized, or wait
for citizens to come to headquarters. There must be a positive outreach program designed to crate interest,
meetings, and inquiries. 6) Like all aspects of good police work, the community-contact strategy requires
careful planning, training, and supervision and the recruitment of able personnel. 7) Learning what works in
any city requires a commitment to the experimental method, in which a new tactic is tried in a way that permits
a systematic, unbiased evaluation of its outcome.
Disorder and Crime
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