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Community Policing in Chicago

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Chicago's experiment with community policing began in April 1993. For more than a year the police department had worked on a plan for Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) and laid the groundwork for implementing it in selected districts. At the heart of the plan lay the reorganization of policing around the city's 279 police beats. Officers assigned to beat teams were expected to engage in identifying and dealing with a broad range of neighborhood problems in partnership with neighborhood residents and community organizations. To give the officers time to identify such problems, some of the burden of responding to 911 calls was shifted to rapid response teams, and in addition tactical units, youth officers, and detectives were expected to work more closely with beat officers. All of these officers shared responsibility for meeting and working with members of the community on a regular basis at beat meetings. At the district level, advisory committees were formed to review issues of wider scope and to discuss strategic issues with district commanders. A prioritizing system was developed for coordinating the delivery of municipal services to support local problem-solving efforts, and new computer technology began to be introduced that would support the analysis of local crime problems.

In the sections that follow, this article evaluates this ambitious program. First, the article examines some general principles of community policing, and then key elements of the city's program are described and analyzed in the context of how well they fit the community policing model. Furthermore, this article briefly describes the findings of an evaluation that examined the impact of community policing on the quality of life in the five pilot districts of Chicago. (Further details about the project can be found in Skogan and Hartnett, 1997.)

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What is Community Policing?

Community policing is not something that is easy to pin down. However, it is evident to this author that it involves reforming decision-making processes and creating new cultures within police departments; it is not a packet of specific tactical plans. It is an organizational strategy that redefines the goals of policing, but leaves the means of achieving them to practitioners in the field. It is a process rather than a product.

One advantage of this view of community policing is that it encourages departments and even individual districts or precincts to develop tactics that are tailored to local issues. Under the rubric of community policing, departments are:

- opening small neighborhood substations,
- conducting surveys to measure community satisfaction,
- organizing meetings and crime prevention seminars,
- publishing newsletters,
- forming neighborhood watch groups,
- establishing advisory panels,
- organizing youth activities,
- conducting drug education projects and media campaigns,
- patrolling on horses and bicycles, and
- working with municipal agencies to enforce health and safety regulations.

These activities often are backed up by organizational goals that are spelled out in "mission statements," and departments all over the country are rewriting their missions to conform to new ideas about the values that should guide policing and the relationship between the police and the community.

However, behind these tactics lie four general principles that need to be recognized, principles that differentiate community policing from other organizational strategies. These four principles will be described at length in the following sections.

Decentralization

Principle 1 Community policing relies upon organizational decentralization and a reorientation of patrol in order to facilitate communication between police and the public.

Police departments traditionally were organized on the assumption that policies and practices are determined at the top, and flow down in the form of rules and orders. The job of management was to see that these rules and orders were carried out. Of course, this organizational chart did not reflect the reality of policing, which is that operational decision making is radically decentralized and highly discretionary, and that most police work takes place outside the direct control of supervisors. But departments maintained this elaborate paramilitary structure because it helped sustain the illusion that police were under control. Police were also amazingly successful at keeping information about themselves and crime proprietary; they released what was useful to them and were secretive about the rest.

The community policing model is more in accord with the way in which departments actually work. It involves *formally* granting neighborhood officers the decision-making authority they need to function effectively. Line officers are expected to work more autonomously at investigating situations, resolving problems, and educating the public. They are asked to discover and set their own goals, and sometimes to manage their work schedule.

This decentralization facilitates the development of local solutions to local problems and discourages the automatic application of central-office policies. The police are not unlike the rest of society, in which large organizations have learned that decentralization often allows flexibility in decision making at the customer contact level.

To increase responsiveness, police are also emulating the general trend in large organizations toward shedding layers of bureaucracy; most departments that adopt a serious community policing stance strip a layer or two from their rank structures to shorten lines of communication within the agency. Police are also reorganizing to provide opportunities for citizens to come into contact with them under circumstances that encourage an information exchange, the development of mutual trust, and engaging in joint or coordinated action. An improvement in relationships between police and the community is a central goal of these programs.

Problem-Oriented Policing

Principle 2 Community policing assumes a commitment to broadly focused, problem-oriented policing.

On its own, problem-oriented policing is a minor revolution in police work. It signifies a reversal of the long-standing disdain that police held for tasks that were not, in their view, "real police work." It represents a shift away from the crime-fighting orientation that police departments have professed since the 1920s. Adopting that stance was useful at the time. It provided a rationale for disconnecting police from politicians and insulating police management from narrow political concerns. Rigid discipline was imposed to combat internal corruption, and officers were shifted rapidly from assignment to assignment so that they would not get too close to the communities they served. Controlling their work from downtown via centralized radio dispatching was a way to ensure that they stuck to the organization's agenda. Later, when big city riots threatened, focusing on "serious crime" at the expense of order maintenance, and adopting a detached pro-

fessional manner was a way to keep out of trouble. "Just the facts, ma'am," was all they wanted.

But police departments now are experiencing the liabilities of having disconnected themselves from any close attachment to the communities they serve. Problem-oriented policing encourages officers to respond creatively to problems that they encounter, or to refer them to public and private agencies that can help. More importantly, it stresses the importance of discovering the situations that produce calls for police assistance, identifying the causes which lie behind them, and designing tactics to deal with these causes. This involves training officers in methods of identifying and analyzing problems; police work traditionally consisted of responding sequentially to individual events, while problem solving involves recognizing patterns of incidents that help identify their causes and suggesting how to deal with them. Police facilitate this with computer analyses of "hot spots" that concentrate large volumes of complaints and calls for service. Problem-oriented policing also recognizes that the solutions to those patterns may involve other agencies and may be "non-police" in character; in traditional departments, this would be cause for ignoring these problems.

Responsive to Community

Principle 3 Community policing requires that police are responsive to the public when they set priorities and develop their tactics.

Effective community policing requires responsiveness to citizen input concerning both the needs of the community and the best ways by which the police can help meet those needs. It takes seriously the public's definition of its own problems. Following a trend that is at work throughout American society, this is often known as "listening to the customer." This is one reason why community policing is an organizational strategy but not a set of specific programs—how it looks in practice *should* vary considerably from place to place, in response to unique local situations and circumstances.

Better "listening" to the community can produce different policing priorities. In our experience, officers involved in neighborhood policing quickly learn that many residents are deeply concerned about problems that previously did not come to police attention. The public often focuses on threatening and fear-provoking *conditions* rather than discrete and legally defined *incidents*. They often are concerned about casual social disorder and the physical decay of their community rather than traditionally defined "serious crimes," but the police are organized to respond to the latter. Community residents are unsure that they could (or even should) rely on the police to help them deal with these problems. These concerns thus do not generate complaints or calls for service, and as a result, the police know surprisingly little about them. Accordingly, community policing requires that departments develop new channels for learning about neighborhood problems.

Partners in Prevention

Principle 4 Community policing implies a commitment to helping neighborhoods solve crime problems on their own, through community organizations and crime prevention programs.

The idea that the police and the public are "co-producers" of safety predates the current rhetoric of community policing. In fact, the community crime prevention movement of the 1970s was an important precursor to community policing. It promulgated widely the idea that crime was not solely the responsibility of the police. The police were quick to endorse the claim that they could not solve crime problems without community support and assistance (in this way the public shared the blame for rising crime rates), and now they find that they are expected to be the catalyst for this effort. They are being called upon to take the lead in mobilizing individuals and organizations around crime prevention. These efforts include neighborhood watch, citizen patrols, and education programs stressing household target-hardening and the rapid reporting of crime.

Chicago's Mission

While some operational planning took place in advance, an important step in the development of Chicago's program was the formulation of an official "mission statement" that set the tone for what was to follow. The statement was featured in a thirty-page document that described, step by step, many of the key components of change needed for the program to succeed in Chicago. The department's mission statement read as follows:

> The Chicago Police Department, as part of, and empowered by the community, is committed to protect the lives, property and rights of all people, to maintain order, and to enforce the law impartially. We will provide quality police service in partnership with other members of the community. To fulfill our mission, we will strive to attain the highest degree of ethical behavior and professional conduct at all times (Chicago Police Department, 1994:2).

The overall report, titled *Together We Can*, opened with a "rationale for change" that reviewed the limits of the traditional model of policing that characterized the department. Drawing on research on policing and a depiction of a crime rate that was soaring despite the department's best efforts, the report argued for a "smarter" approach to policing that capitalized on the strength of the city's neighborhoods. It argued that the department had to be "reinvented" so it could form a partnership with the community that stressed crime prevention, customer service, and honest and ethical conduct. Almost half of the document focused on what had to be reinvented, ranging from officer selection to department management, training, performance evaluation, call dispatching, technology, and budgeting. The

document was mailed to every member of the department, and to help ensure that it was read, it was included on the reading list from which questions would be drawn for the next promotion exam. Its concreteness helped it become the basis for planning the eventual citywide implementation of Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy.

The Program

While a myriad of practical details were involved in setting change in motion among the department's fifteen thousand employees, the program that emerged had six key elements.

Departmental Involvement

The entire department (eventually) was to be involved. Rather than forming special units, the department was committed to changing its entire organization. Community policing roles were to be developed for all of the units in the organization, including detectives, tactical units, officers working with gangs, and narcotics officers, rather than just uniformed patrol officers working in the districts. Most of this had to wait until the program had proven itself in the patrol division, however. During the first year a few units were decentralized, so that district commanders had control over plain-clothes tactical units and youth officers, and they could integrate the efforts of those special units with plans being developed at the grassroots level.

The commitment to citywide involvement was reflected in the decision to test the new program in diverse pilot districts, several of which were very high crime areas, using existing personnel and leadership. In the words of one department executive, they did not "stack the deck in favor of success." The department's managers knew that once the program encompassed the entire city, it had to continue to work with the talent that the department already had. While in some cities community policing is confined to selected districts, or utilizes volunteer officers (often being paid overtime through special federal programs), eventually Chicago was going to have to make the program work using its existing personnel, and within its budget.

Permanent Assignments

Officers were given permanent beat assignments. To give careful attention to the residents and specific problems of various neighborhoods required officers to know their beats, including the problems, trends, hot spots, resources, and relationships there. In order to develop partnerships with the community they had to stay in one place long enough for residents to know and learn to trust them, and officers had to have enough free time to engage in community work. However, the experience of other cities made clear the importance of continuing to maintain acceptable levels of response to 911 calls at the same time.

The fundamental geographical building block of the new program was the beat. The city's 25 police districts are divided into 279 beats, which average 10,000 residents and 4,100 households. The districts each have between nine and fifteen beats, staffed with officers that were assigned to the district partly by a "weighted workload" formula that took into account calls for service from the area. To resolve conflicts between the dual priorities of working with the public and responding promptly to calls for service, officers in each district were divided into beat teams and rapid response units. Beat teams were to be dispatched less frequently so that they had time to work on neighborhood projects. Whenever possible they were to be sent only to calls that originated in their beat, and even then they were to be exempted from certain classes of calls to which their turf specialization did not seem to make any contribution. The goal was to keep beat teams on their turf—thus maintaining "beat integrity"—at least 70 percent of the time. Other calls were to be assigned to rapid response units, tactical officers and other teams that ranged throughout the district.

Which officers served in which roles was a complicated matter that was closely regulated by the city's contract with the police union. In Chicago, officers choose their district and shift through a bidding system based on seniority. (There were tradeoffs; we knew officers with almost 20 years of seniority who had to work the midnight shift to get the district assignment of their choice.) Only within those parameters could district commanders decide which officers would serve in beat or rapid response units.

In the pilot districts they generally relied on their lieutenants and sergeants to negotiate the matter shift by shift, which was further complicated by the desire of most officers to remain attached to their partners. However, in general, officers seemed to get the assignment they wanted. Those who craved the excitement of responding to a succession of hot 911 calls jockeyed to get into a rapid response car, while those who were interested in community-oriented work gravitated to beat teams. But the yearly re-bidding process meant that they could be bumped from their position, or that they could try to improve their lot as they accumulated a bit more seniority, so that there was a steady circulation of officers through various assignments over time. The union contract thus mitigated against the creation of a force split permanently between community and traditional policing, something that CAPS' managers wanted to avoid in any event. It also meant that there was somewhat more turnover in beat assignments than some community groups thought was optimal.

Training

There was a serious commitment to training. The department invested an immense amount of effort, at a critical time, in training officers and their supervisors in the skills required to identify and solve problems in conjunction with the community. Training was considered absolutely essential to promoting officer understanding and commitment to the program, as well as providing direction to officers

and supervisors in their new roles. Without adequate training they would inevitably fall back on what they knew best, which was the tried and true routines of traditional policing.

Several cities that have tried to implement community policing ignored the importance of training and, in effect, merely instructed their officers to "go out and do it." Not surprisingly, they failed to mount serious programs. Chicago believed that by putting a strong emphasis on training they also would send the message to the rank-and-file officers that community policing was real and that downtown was committed to the program. The training program that was developed was co-taught by civilian trainers. It included officers of all ranks who were about to serve in the pilot districts, and everyone received several days of training before the program began.

Community Involvement

The community is to play a significant role. At the core of CAPS lay the formation of police-community partnerships focused on identifying and solving problems at the neighborhood level. Community policing assumes that police cannot solve neighborhood problems on their own; it depends on the cooperation of the community and public and private agencies to achieve success. In Chicago, one problem-solving role for police was to engage community resources and draw other city agencies into identifying and responding to local concerns. *Together We Can* noted, ". . . the Department and the rest of the community must establish new ways of actually working together. New methods must be put in place to jointly identify problems, propose solutions, and implement changes. The Department's ultimate goal should be community empowerment" (Chicago Police Department, 1994:16).

This commitment to community involvement was operationalized in two ways. Beat meetings began in every beat. They were regular—usually monthly—gatherings of small groups of residents and officers who actually worked the beat. These meetings were held in church basements and park buildings all over the city. In addition, advisory committees were formed at the district level to meet with commanders and district staff. They were composed of community leaders, school council members, ministers, business operators, and representatives of institutions of significance in the district. Beat meetings and district advisory committee gatherings were the principal forums for the development of joint police-citizen plans to tackle neighborhood issues.

Social Service

Policing was linked to the delivery of city services. Community policing inevitably involved the expansion of the police mandate to include a broad range of concerns that previously lay outside their competence. In other words, as the program's detractors put it, they were expected to be "social workers." The expansion of the police mandate was a response to several factors.

Senior managers understood that police could put a temporary lid on many crime-related problems, but they could never fix them. They wanted to create problem-solving systems that could keep the lid on even after they had moved on. The involvement of the police in coordinating services also reflected city hall's plan to use CAPS to inject more discipline into the city's service delivery system. Service standards and accountability mechanisms were put in place that advanced the mayor's municipal efficiency agenda as well as supporting problem solving.

The expansion of the mandate also reflected consumer demand—when beat officers met with neighborhood residents, the concerns that were voiced included all types of problems, and the kinds of crimes that police traditionally are organized to tackle often were fairly low on the priority list. CAPS' managers knew that if the response of officers to community concerns was, "that's not a police matter," residents would not show up for another meeting.

Therefore, from the beginning, the delivery of city services in the pilot districts was linked to community policing via special service request forms. They were to be generated by everyone, but were the special domain of beat teams. Officers' service requests triggered a prioritizing and case-tracking process that greatly increased the responsiveness of other city agencies. The successful integration of CAPS with a broad range of city services was one of the most important organizational successes of the first year of the program.

Crime Analysis

There was an emphasis on crime analysis. From the outset, geographic crime analysis was considered a key component of community policing in Chicago. It was to form the "knowledge base" that would drive the beat problem-solving process and the tactical operations of special squads. Computer technology was to speed the collection and analysis of data to identify crime patterns and target areas that demand police attention. An easy-to-use crime mapping system was to be developed to run on computers at each district station. Overnight data entry ensured that the results were timely.

Crime maps were to be routinely distributed at beat meetings and accessible to the public at each station. Other analytic tools included "beat planners," which were notebooks of local information maintained by beat officers. Also, new roll call procedures were to be developed to encourage officers to share information across watches about beat-level events and community resources. All of this was intended to foster problem solving at the beat level.

The Pilot Districts

The police districts in which the program was developed are illustrated in figure 1. They broadly represented the city's neighborhoods. They ranged from fairly

Figure 1
Chicago's Pilot Police Districts



affluent to desperately poor, and from racially heterogeneous to solidly segregated by race.

Rogers Park was the most ethnically diverse; 17 percent of its residents were black, 14 percent Hispanic, and 58 percent white, with many other ethnic groups comprising the remaining 11 percent. Almost all residents of Austin and Englewood, on the other hand, were African American. Marquette was divided among blacks (to the north) and Hispanics (to the south), with the latter making up almost 60 percent of the total. Only slightly more than half the adults in Marquette had graduated from high school. On the other hand, in Morgan Park middle-class whites constituted a 40 percent minority, while about 60 percent of the district's residents were African Americans. Morgan Park residents were easily the most affluent; 80 percent were home owners. Rogers Park residents were significantly better off than those of the remaining districts, but they were the most transient; only 24 percent had lived there for a decade, while the comparable figure for Morgan Park was 62 percent. In Austin and Englewood, about 30 percent of households were headed by females and almost an equal number of residents were living below the poverty line.

The Impact of the CAPS Program

This section summarizes what we found concerning the impact of CAPS in the pilot districts. While a great deal of data collection took place, this article reports on the findings of surveys that were conducted before the program began, and again fourteen to eighteen months later.

Census data were used to select sections of the city which closely matched the demography of the five pilot areas. These "comparison areas" were used to represent (roughly) what *would* have happened in the pilot districts *if* there had been no CAPS program, for it was not put in motion in other parts of the city until the end of the development period.

All of the interviews were conducted by telephone in English and Spanish. An average of 180 residents were interviewed twice in each of the pilot districts and 150 in their comparison areas. The analysis of the data compared the results of the two waves of surveys in pairs, contrasting any "before-and-after" changes in each pilot district with what happened over the same time span in its comparison area. When there is a change in a pilot district but no comparable shift in the comparison area—or vice versa—it could be evidence that the program made a difference.

Assessments of Trends in Policing

There was evidence that CAPS had some impact on people's *optimism* about trends in policing in Chicago. To gauge this, respondents were asked if the police in their neighborhood had gotten better, worse, or stayed about the same during

the past year. Figure 2 indicates that in four out of five pilot districts there were significant increases in optimism after the first year or more of the program.

Figure 2 presents Wave 1 and Wave 2 survey results (labeled "W1" and "W2") for the pilot districts and their comparison areas, to facilitate comparisons between any over-time changes in those results. (This format will be repeated in the next figure as well.) The values in parentheses near the bottom of the figure present the statistical significance of the W1–W2 changes within an area; a figure of 0.05 or less is generally accepted as a reliable change, although we will also pay attention to patterns of results that lie within the 0.05-to-0.10 range as well.

Figure 2 depicts visible increases in optimism in Englewood, Marquette, Austin and Morgan Park. The percentage of residents who thought policing had gotten better over the first year or more of CAPS was up by about one-third in each case. For Englewood and Austin there were also no parallel changes in the comparison areas, and the differences between the two were statistically significant. However, for Morgan Park and Marquette optimism was also up in the comparison area, and the comparison area for Rogers Park was the only area of that pair that changed significantly. In these three cases it is not clear that CAPS had as much impact on this aspect of public opinion. Analysis of the data for population groups indicated that optimism was generally up among African Americans, but not much among whites or Hispanics.

Impact on Neighborhood Problems

The surveys also gathered data on the extent of neighborhood problems, as viewed through the eyes of the people who lived there. In the interviews, respondents were quizzed about 18 specific issues that the evaluators thought—before the program began—might be problems in various parts of the city. Neighborhood residents were asked to rate each of them as "a big problem," "some problem," or "no problem." The analysis focused on the *four biggest problems* that residents of each area nominated in the first interview, and tracked the ratings given these issues a year or more later when they were interviewed again. This analysis lets residents "set the agenda" for the evaluation, through their expressions of concern about neighborhood conditions.

Two problems on the list were of virtually universal concern. "Street drug dealing" was one of the top-ranked problems in every area we studied, and "shooting and violence by gangs" was one of the leading problems in four of the five pilot districts (with only the exception of Rogers Park). These are both challenging issues that lie near the core of the city's crime problems in the 1990s.

Otherwise, a wide range of problems were identified as particularly vexing. In two areas car vandalism was near the top of the list, and in two others household vandalism ranked highly. Problems with "people being attacked or robbed" were also rated highly in two areas. Auto theft, burglary, disruptions around schools,

Figure 2
Trend in Policing Last Year



Figure 3
Neighborhood Problems in Englewood



abandoned buildings, and "vacant lots filled with trash and junk" each stood near the top of the list in one district.

It is important to note that the initial level of these "biggest problems" varied considerably from district to district. For example, street drug dealing was rated a big problem by 60 percent or more of residents of Englewood, Marquette, and Austin. On the other hand, only about 13 percent of the residents of Morgan Park and 20 percent of those we interviewed in Rogers Park thought this was a big problem, even though it was one of the areas' top-ranked issues before CAPS was initiated. In Morgan Park, burglary was a top-ranked problem, but only 10 percent of residents gave it a high rating. In Morgan Park in particular, there was not as much room for improvement on many dimensions, and expectations about the impact of CAPS there should be tempered by this reality.

Figure 3 illustrates the findings for one of Chicago's experimental areas, Englewood. Englewood is an extremely poor and largely African-American neighborhood. During the early 1990s it had one of the highest homicide rates in the city. Before the program began more than 60 percent of the residents of Englewood rated street drug dealing a big problem, and gang violence was the number three problem there. But the two other most highly-ranked problems turned out to be "quality of life" issues. Problems with vacant lots filled with trash and junk stood near the top of the list, and so did the large number (600, by one estimate) of abandoned buildings which plagued the district. In fact, in four of the five experimental areas, two of the top four problems were quality of life concerns rather than conventionally serious criminal offenses.

Figure 3 also presents problem ratings for Englewood and its comparison area, for both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 surveys. The statistical significance of each over-time change is presented as well. However, the conclusions about over-time changes presented in this article are based on the results of statistical analyses of the data using repeated measures analysis of variance, which focuses on the significance of differential changes in the means of the outcome measures over time. This analysis used the full range of the measures, and not just the "big problems" percentages that are illustrated in figure 3.

The findings for Englewood can be summarized as follows: all four of the community's biggest problems declined, while none went down significantly in Englewood's comparison area. Street drug sales was ranked a big problem by 62 percent of Englewood residents in 1993, but by only 49 percent in 1994. Abandoned building problems dropped from 43 percent to 27 percent, and problems with litter from 37 to 23 percent. Gang violence was down only modestly (the percentage who thought it was a big problem declined from 41 to 35 percent), but it increased significantly in Englewood's comparison area.

These findings reflect the relative vigor with which Englewood used the city service request process. Englewood residents and police were extremely successful at mobilizing city services to respond to both of its decay problems. During the sixteen months ending in August 1994, they generated 1,314 service requests to attend to abandoned buildings, and 2,379 requests for special service from the Department of Streets and Sanitation. In both cases Englewood's service request count ranked number one among the five experimental areas, both absolutely and relative to the size of their populations. There was a request to deal with an abandoned building for every eighty-five Englewood residents. As figure 3 illustrates, perceptions of the extent of both problems went down significantly in Englewood during that period. In addition, gang and drug problems were the focus of marches by community members, organized by a coalition of local churches. The district's commander was easily the most charismatic and energetic of the group.

Based on this kind of analysis, the findings for the other districts were:

Marquette: graffiti, the area's second biggest problem, went down; a decline in street drug dealing was not significant.

Austin: gang violence, drug dealing, and assault and robbery went down; a decline in school disruption was not significant.

Rogers Park: assault and robbery went down; declines in the area's other problems (drugs, graffiti, and car vandalism) were not significant.

Morgan Park: every problem in this area declined at least slightly, but none of the declines can be clearly attributed to CAPS: problems in Morgan Park were already lower than anywhere else, and reductions in several problems were paralleled by declines in the comparison area.

Discussion

Did Chicago's program speak to all of the core elements of community policing? As noted at the outset, the first requirement was decentralization and reorientation of patrol. In Chicago, district commanders were empowered to experiment with locally-arrived-at solutions to local problems. The roles of patrol officers were drastically altered, as many of them were "cut loose" from the 911 system to devote time to community outreach and problem solving on their own new turf.

The second requirement was that police assume a commitment to broadly focused problem solving. In Chicago, one of the biggest early successes of the program was its link to the delivery of a broad range of city services, from auto towing to street sign replacement and building code inspections. The Marquette district, where graffiti problems went down significantly, was the single greatest user of the city's graffiti-removal services.

The third requirement was that the police be responsive to the public when they set priorities. The arenas for this in Chicago were the new district advisory committees and the small-area beat meetings, places where residents could describe their problems and discuss how to solve them.

Finally, community policing implies a commitment to crime prevention and neighborhood self help. Chicago's model of problem solving stressed the role

played by neighborhood residents in resolving their *own* problems, backstopped by the police where necessary. The beat meetings were to be the locus for dividing up those tasks, while at the district level the advisory committees were to focus more on finding the resources required to address larger-scale, area-wide problems.

Not only did Chicago's CAPS program seem to incorporate all of the elements of community policing, it also seemed to work. Residents of the pilot districts reported that they saw less social disorder and physical decay, and serious crime went down in several areas, due to the program. They thought they were getting better police service, and that belief grew the most among African Americans. Chicago still had a great deal left to accomplish after the experimental period, including finding ways to expand the program to encompass the entire city, but the months spent in developing and testing the program seem to have paid off.

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