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COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNITY POLICING

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This chapter examines the role of the public in community policing. Every definition of community policing shares the idea that the police and the community must work together to define and develop solutions to problems (Sadd & Grinc, 1994). One rationale for public involvement is the belief that police alone can neither create nor maintain safe communities. They can help by setting in motion voluntary local efforts to prevent disorder and crime; in this role, they are adjuncts to community crime prevention efforts such as Neighborhood Watch, target hardening, and youth and economic development programs. A common justification for diverting resources from responding to 911 calls is that community policing will ultimately prevent problems from occurring in the first place, and that many that still do will be dealt with locally without police assistance, or by agencies other than the police (Trojanowicz, 1986).

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Community involvement is also frequently justified by pointing to the growing customer orientation of public service agencies. It is argued that by opening themselves to citizen input the police will become more knowledgeable about, and responsive to, the varying concerns of different communities. Police already knew that even the conventional crimes that are reported vary from place to place in mix as well as by frequency, and that many of the tactics developed downtown in response to media or political pressures do not make sense in particular areas. However, "one size fits all" is too frequently the way policies are tried on in police departments. Another strand of this argument is that police have "over-professionalized" themselves and their mission, and as a result systematically overlook many pressing community concerns because they lie outside of their narrowly defined mandate (Skogan, 1990a). Because these concerns (which can range from public drinking to building abandonment) frequently have deleterious consequences for the communities involved, expanding the scope of the police mandate by making them more "market driven" helps the state be more effective at its most fundamental task, maintaining order.

Yet in an environment dominated by skepticism about the ability of police departments actually to implement serious community policing efforts, it is easy to underestimate how difficult it can be to build effective community commitment as well. In a recent evaluation of community policing programs in eight cities, the Vera Institute found that all of them experienced great difficulty in establishing a solid relationship between the programs and neighborhood residents (Grinc, 1994; Sadd & Grinc, 1994). Efforts to do so floundered in part on decades of built-up hostility between residents of poor or minority communities and the police. Distrust and fear of the police were rampant in many of the neighborhoods where community policing was instituted. Residents' fear of retaliation from drug dealers further stifled participation in public events. The evaluators concluded that the assumption that residents *want* closer contact with the police, and want to work with them, is "untested."

It is also uncertain that rank and file officers involved in these programs are any more enthusiastic, especially at the outset. This chapter reports on the findings of an evaluation of community policing in Chicago, and surveys there

of officers who were involved in the program found that they were particularly resistant to letting citizens "set their agenda." For example, 72% of them were pessimistic about "unreasonable demands on police by community groups" under the new policing strategy (Skogan, 1996). Many police in Chicago were initially skeptical about whether citizens would participate in the program, fearing that "loudmouths" and "gimmie-guys" would dominate public proceedings and use the program to advance their own personal and political agendas. Behind the scenes, they were nervous about how they would be greeted and treated at public meetings. At the outset, police often defined the public's appropriate role in community policing in the most narrow and traditional terms, as their "eyes and ears."

Another difficulty is that programs that rely on citizen initiative and self-help can be regressive rather than progressive in their impact. Often it is home-owning, long-term residents of a community who learn about and participate more readily in voluntary programs. An evaluation of community policing in Houston (Skogan, 1990a) found strong evidence for this. In several experimental districts, community policing efforts were much more visible among whites than among African Americans or Hispanics, and they were more likely to become involved. Analysis of the impact of the program indicated that its positive effects were confined to whites, while the lives of other residents of the heterogeneous program areas were unaffected. There seemed to be two reasons for this. First, better-organized home-owning whites were poised to take advantage of the resources that the program brought to their neighborhoods. Second, the management of the program allowed officers to pick and choose their target populations. They naturally focused their efforts in places where they felt most welcome and where their initial efforts seemed to be most effective because people got involved.

It is also clearly possible to conduct "problem-solving policing" without widespread citizen participation, or even much public input. Several of the examples of problem solving documented in Newport News involved police analyses of calls-for-service and crime incident data, and data from other public agencies. The department's operating Task Force and Problem Analysis Advisory Committee were both made up just of police officers (Eck & Spelman, 1987a). Newport News developed the "SARA" process for problem identification and problem solving for its own, internal consumption.

Murphy (1993b) argues that the Canadian approach to community policing has been particularly conservative in this regard. He notes, "the community is viewed as a resource, a support group and an information source rather than as an authoritative body" (pp. 20-21). In Canada, community policing remains police-managed and seldom involves civilians in policy or accountability issues. For example, Edmonton relies on foot constables to gather community input through their day-to-day contact with area residents and merchants (Hornick, Burrows, Philips, & Leighton, 1993). In Victoria, the principal role for civilians was to serve as staff volunteers in a storefront police office (Walker, Walker, & McDavid, 1993). Leighton (1993) describes the formation of "community consultative committees" in several cities, and indicates they are still finding a role for themselves in advising police operations. In contrast, Chicago's community policing effort provides a structured avenue for citizen participation in problem identification and priority setting, and creates a channel through which community residents can demand some measure of accountability for police performance in their area.

THE CHICAGO EVALUATION

This chapter examines the role of citizen participation in a new community policing program. It focuses on two roughly comparable police districts, and contrasts what happened there over the course of the program to parallel changes in matched comparison areas. The latter represented "what would have happened" if there had been no program. The data are drawn from an ongoing evaluation of the adoption of community policing by the City of Chicago (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). While the new model of policing that was crafted by the Chicago Police Department is multifaceted, at its core lies the (anticipated) formation of police-community partnerships focused on problem identification and problem solving at the neighborhood level. The agency's mission statement notes, "the Department and the rest of the community must establish new ways of actually working together. New methods must be put in place to jointly identify problems, propose solutions, and implement changes. The Department's ultimate goal should be community empowerment" (Chicago Police Department, 1993, p. 16). Behind the lines, the agency seems driven by two concerns: to increase the effectiveness of the patrol force by targeting issues of public concern, and healing the yawning breach that has opened between the police and racial and ethnic minorities in the community. The first 14 months of the program provided a laboratory for examining the role of the public in community policing. While it is too soon to determine if the public has indeed been "empowered" by the program, there is now some evidence concerning patterns of program awareness and participation in several experimental police districts.

The Program

Beginning in May 1993, Chicago's community policing program (dubbed CAPS, for Chicago's *A*lternative *P*olicing *S*trategy) was tested in five police districts. In those areas, patrol officers were divided on a rotating basis into beat teams and rapid response units. Tasks were assigned so that beat team members would have sufficient free time to attend meetings and work with community members. An average of 45 extra officers (an increment of about 12%) were assigned to each district, so that commanders had the personnel they needed to attend to both beat and rapid response needs. Other units were decentralized, so that local commanders had control over various plainclothes tactical units and youth officers and could integrate their efforts with plans being developed at the grassroots level. The department launched a training effort to ensure that officers and their immediate supervisors understood the new roles and responsibilities that they were being called upon to adopt. In recognition that problem-solving policing needs the support of a wide range of agencies, an effort was made to rationalize the delivery of city services by linking them to service requests generated via beat teams.

Beat Meetings

One of the most visible components of the department's new structure was beat meetings. Beats are the smallest geographical unit of police organization in Chicago; the city's 25 Police Districts are divided into 279 beats. At the median, beats in the 5 experimental districts covered 48 city blocks and included about 9,000 people and 3,000 households. Before community policing, officers were not regularly assigned to work in small areas; the bulk of police work in the districts was done by pairs of officers responding to 911 calls, driving anywhere in (and sometimes out of) their assigned district. It is likely that most officers did not know where the boundaries of the beats lay. The city's new model of policing, on the other hand, is turf based. Teams of beat officers are assigned to their job for at least a year. The experimental districts were staffed and 911 dispatching was controlled to allow these officers to stay on their beat about 70% of the time, handling selected classes of routine calls as well as doing less traditional work.

Beat meetings are regular gatherings of small groups of residents and police officers. The meetings are open to the public, and for the period considered here, most beats met once a month. In each of the two prototype police districts that will be examined below there were approximately 135

beat meetings—one per beat, per month—during the evaluation period. These gatherings were held in church basements, meeting rooms in park buildings, and school rooms throughout the districts. Beat meetings were to be the forum for identifying and prioritizing local problems and developing plans to tackle them. The vision driving the program calls for the formation of "partnerships" between the police and the public in identifying, prioritizing, and solving those problems. The program calls for police to become proactive problem seekers, along with their civilian partners. They are to work together to prevent crime, rather than just continuing to respond to an endless stream of seemingly disconnected incidents (Goldstein, 1990).

To this end, police and residents are supposed to meet one another at the beat meetings, so that civilians will know who is working in their area and police will learn who the "good people" are in their area. To facilitate this, officers who serve on beat teams from all three working shifts are assigned to be present at each meeting, along with a sergeant who supervises activities on the beat, gang and tactical unit officers, and other officers from the Neighborhood Relations unit. In the experimental area with the best recordkeeping, meeting logs compiled by the officers who attended indicate that an average of seven officers attended each meeting. At least one representative of a city service agency was also usually present, and someone representing a local community organization made a statement at about one half of the meetings.

Beat meetings are also supposed to lead to the exchange of information between police and the public. Over time, we observed that police increasingly brought with them district and crime maps, lists of offenses and arrests, and other information. For their part, residents were rarely reticent to bring up specific problems or problem areas. Beat meetings are intended to break barriers of distrust between residents and the police. Officers initially objected to working with people who came to meetings because they perceived that they would be somehow "unrepresentative" of the community. We observed that over time some of the initial fears that police brought to them—that the meetings would be dominated by "loud mouths," and that the officers present would be "put on the hot seat" as charges against the police were hurled around the room—were not founded. What they encountered were, by and large, reasonable and concerned people who applauded when they stood to be introduced. Officers also seemed to overcome their initial fear they would not be good public speakers, for speeches were rarely called for. No one seemed put off by blunt, practical talk.

In both experimental areas there were extensive efforts to advertise beat meetings, and to turn out residents in large numbers. Community newspapers

TABLE 5.1 Organizational Efforts Surrounding CAPS Meetings

Organizational Activity	*Morgan Park (%)*	*Rogers Park (%)*
Holding general, public meetings related to CAPS	53	56
Distributing newsletters or flyers related to CAPS	64	64
Encouraging people to attend CAPS-related meetings	87	81
Sending representatives to CAPS-related meetings	89	88
Number of organizations	(45)	(59)

printed beat meeting schedules. Activists posted announcements and shoved flyers into people's mail boxes. In a related study, we identified 250 neighborhood organizations active in the five test districts and interviewed two informants each about their organization's activities. Ninety organizations were studied in the two prototype districts examined here: 59 of them were active in Rogers Park, and 45 in Morgan Park. Table 5.1 indicates the percentage of those organizations that were involved in each of a checklist of efforts to mobilize their communities around CAPS. Encouraging people to attend beat meetings and sending representatives to the meetings was nearly ubiquitous. A large majority of these groups was involved in advertising CAPS-related activities. A majority even held their own public meetings about the program, and, as will be detailed below, community groups played an important role in hosting and running them as well.

While it hard to judge what a "good" attendance figure would be, police department logs for Morgan Park indicate that an average of 35 people attended each beat meeting in that district. This figure agrees with an areawide survey conducted 14 months after the program began. The survey asked respondents who had attended a meeting how many people typically came; their average estimate was similar, 31 in Morgan Park, and 30 in Rogers Park. A plot of the over-time data on beat meeting attendance in Morgan Park indicates that it was seasonal, low in January and February.

Data and Research Design

To gauge public opinion on the eve of the new program, survey interviews were conducted with residents of the prototype districts and the matched neighborhoods that serve as comparison areas for the evaluation. The interviews were conducted by telephone, using a combination of listed directory and randomly generated telephone numbers. The first round of interviews was

completed before the program began. In June 1994, respondents in two of the prototype districts and their comparison areas were reinterviewed in order to assess changes in levels of program awareness and contact during the first 14 months of the program. Residents of the remaining prototype and comparison areas were reinterviewed later.

The two prototype areas were both diverse. Morgan Park (District 22) residents were 60% African American, and 80% were home owners. Nine percent of households there fell below the poverty line, and 62% of residents had lived in the community more than 10 years. Rogers Park (District 24) residents were 58% white, 17% African American, and 14% Hispanic. About 16% of households were below the poverty line, and only 24% of residents had lived there more than a decade.

Opportunities for Participation

Potentially, one of the most important aspects of CAPS is that it created new opportunities for participation in anticrime efforts that were relatively uniform across the city. This is quite unlike the distribution of autonomously created and independently active groups. Research on the social and geographic distribution of opportunities to participate in organized group activity indicates that they are least common where they appear to be most needed—in low-income, heterogeneous, deteriorated, high turnover areas. Ironically, community organizations focusing on crime issues are more common in better-off neighborhoods, while poorer areas characterized by high levels of fear, fatalism, mutual distrust, and despair are less well served.

This is important because individuals participate within a neighborhood context that defines the alternatives open to them. With the exception of those few entrepreneurs who create new organizations, people can participate only by affiliating with active groups. Who participates and in what capacity thus turns on what opportunities for participation are available—which varies from place to place. By creating relatively uniform opportunities for participation, CAPS went one step down the road toward mobilizing wider participation among all segments of the community.

The first question is, then, Did the program indeed create new opportunities for citizen participation? If there was little awareness of the new program or knowledge of how to participate, the impact of all of the effort surrounding the inauguration of beat meetings in the prototype districts would be severely muted. To examine this, respondents were asked two questions in sequence that probed their awareness of neighborhood opportunities to participate:

During the past year, have you heard about efforts to get community meetings started up in your neighborhood?

During the past year, have there actually been any community meetings held here in your neighborhood to try to deal with crime problems?

These questions gave respondents two opportunities to recall instances of organizational efforts in their community. We did not ask specifically about "beat meetings" because that term was unlikely to be recognized by people who did not attend any meetings, nor by anyone in the survey conducted before the program began. Responses to these two questions were combined to identify the extent of awareness of organizing efforts in the program and comparison areas. Changes in levels of program awareness in the prototype and comparison areas between 1993 and 1994 provide evidence about the impact of the program.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the extent of this impact. In both prototype areas, awareness of organized activity increased during the 14 months between the surveys, and both changes were statistically significant. Awareness of opportunities to participate actually declined in the Morgan Park comparison area, and they did not change significantly in the Rogers Park control area. Parallel citywide surveys were conducted at the same two points in time, and they also indicated that awareness of opportunities to participate did not change for city residents as a whole.

Although the changes presented in Figure 5.1 were statistically significant, the magnitude of the program versus comparison group differences depicted there probably were muted by the sheer level of preexisting organized activism in Chicago. It is a highly neighborhood-oriented city with strong local political organizations, decentralized municipal services, and a long tradition of achieving community goals through turf-based organizing. As a result, even before the program began, levels of awareness of opportunities for participation were already very high. This imposed a "ceiling" on potential program effects against which even the most effective program must bump.

WHO GOT THE MESSAGE?

Not surprisingly, awareness of opportunities to participate in community policing was not evenly distributed in the population. In fact, it very much resembled the findings of past research on the distribution of opportunities to participate. By the time of our second survey, stable, family-oriented people



Figure 5.1. Opportunities for Participation

with investments in the community were more likely to have gotten the message. While patterns of awareness varied a bit by area, program awareness in the prototypes was more extensive among higher income, more highly educated people, middle-aged married couples, home owners, and whites. Awareness was higher in households that were heavily networked with others in the community. Compared to those who had not heard about community organizing efforts in their area, those who had were already (measured at Wave I) more concerned about crime, physical decay, and disruption in the schools serving their neighborhood. People with past victimization experience also were more likely to have heard about organizing efforts. The impact of many of these factors on program awareness is illustrated in Figure 5.2.

Patterns of Participation

The next question is: Who took advantage of these new opportunities to participate? Two issues are involved in that question. The first is *levels* of participation. Did more people participate following the onset of community policing, taking advantage of the regular, visible opportunities for participation that it created? The second, and perhaps more important, issue is that of the *distribution* of participation. Inevitably, relatively few residents will ever be directly involved in community policing, even to the level of just attending a public meeting. In my view, the important questions this raises are: Are the processes of public involvement broadly inclusive? Are all of the interests and issues facing the community being represented? In particular, we are interested in whether participation followed familiar patterns, encouraging yet higher levels of activism among better off people who already dominate organized community life. Or, was participation in some fashion redistributive; that is, did community policing bring in "new blood" that along important dimensions represented new and less enfranchised elements of the community? We have already seen that awareness of the opportunities to participate that Chicago's program provided were more distributive than redistributive, calling for a close look at the data concerning this issue.

The issue of levels of participation is addressed in Figure 5.3. It illustrates the results of before-and-after surveys of residents of the prototype and comparison areas. If respondents indicated that they had heard of organized group efforts in their neighborhood, they were asked, *Were you able to attend any of the meetings?* Figure 5.3 classifies each respondent as a participant or nonparticipant (those who had never heard of meetings were also classified as nonparticipants), and charts the percentage of respondents in each evaluation area that fell in the former category.



Figure 5.2. Demographics of Program Awareness

None of the before-after differences in levels of participation depicted in Figure 5.3 are statistically significant. In Morgan Park, participation rose an insignificant one percentage point, and in Rogers park it stood rock-steady. The slight declines in participation in the two comparison areas were not significant, in light of the sample sizes involved. More elaborate analyses that pooled program and comparison areas and controlled for the effects of individual-level demographic factors such as sex, age, and length of residence before looking for effects attributable to the program did not change this picture at all.

It was still possible, however, that extensive outreach and organizing efforts in the prototype areas changed the *character* of participation. The experimental districts may not have had to rely so heavily on "self-starters," given the broad opportunities for participation created by the program and the extensive effort that went into generating participation in beat meetings. Unlike many past efforts at local organizing, the structure imposed by the program ensured that meetings were held on a regular basis in every beat, not just in places that had the resources to sponsor them, or where initial organizing efforts were well received. As Table 5.1 above indicated, considerable effort was also put into generating participation in beat meetings, by many organizations in each of these relatively small areas. In Morgan Park, a large and powerful community organization representing white home owners in one part of the district extended their franchise to cover the entire district, and put their considerable resources and political influence into generating participation in meetings all over the area. Another powerful organization serving the southern end of Rogers Park hired a professional community organizer to generate attendance and nurture the program in their service area. The most intensive organizational efforts in Rogers Park were in its higher crime beats, which are diverse and feisty neighborhoods.

In both Morgan Park and Rogers Park, our evaluation indeed found some evidence that both program awareness and actual participation was mildly redistributive in character. That is, new elements in the community were mobilized as a result of CAPS.

To examine this it was necessary to distinguish between two groups of activists: those who at Wave II were involved in organized community efforts for the first time ("new blood") and those who had been involved in community affairs before the onset of Chicago's program and continued to be aware and active after it came to their district ("retreads"). At the time they were reinterviewed, about 68% of residents in Morgan Park and Rogers Park who were aware of opportunities to participate in their area were retreads, while



Figure 5.3. Participation in Community Meetings

the remaining third were newly informed. Among participants, those in Morgan Park split about 50-50, while about 70% of participants from Rogers Park were experienced activists and 30% were new to the scene.

Retreads and newly informed or involved area residents differed on several important dimensions. The first of these is illustrated in Figure 5.4. It depicts the percentage of retreads and new blood in June 1994 who were either black, Hispanic, or of another race ("percent nonwhite"). It compares respondents drawn from the prototype and comparison areas, to examine the potential impact of CAPS on the breadth of community mobilization. All prototype and comparison-area respondents are grouped together because of the smaller sample sizes involved in this detailed analysis, but the trends described here were at work in each experimental and control area. As Figure 5.4 suggests, differences in the racial composition of the two groups were large (and statistically significant) in the prototype areas, and small (and insignificant) in the comparison areas.

The same pattern can be observed for other key demographic factors, some of which are detailed in Table 5.2. Relative to events in the comparison areas, it appears that beat meetings expanded involvement for women, nonwhites, and those nearer the bottom of the educational ladder (here presented as the percentage that did not go to college, a significant general predictor of awareness and participation). One important factor that did not appear to change as a result of this apparent expansion in the participation base for the program was home ownership. In the prototypes, slightly *more* new participants than old were home owners.

Did new participants differ in significant ways in terms of the kinds of *concerns* they brought to the meetings? The survey included questions measuring three different views of the police. One set of 10 questions tapped respondents' views of the quality of police service; 3 others asked about police aggressiveness on the street and their use of excessive force; and 2 judged respondents' optimism about the future of policing in Chicago. None of these attitudes varied significantly with participation status. Similarly, new participants were neither more nor less fearful of crime, nor more nor less concerned about crime or neighborhood decay. In terms of their views of the neighborhood, they closely resembled those who were already involved in anticrime efforts. Both groups differed more from nonparticipants; those who were not involved perceived less crime and neighborhood decay, and were less positive about the future of policing in Chicago, than participants of any stripe.



Figure 5.4. New Versus Recycled Activists; Percentage Nonwhite

TABLE 5.2 Demographics of Awareness and Participation by New and Continuing Status

	Awareness		*Participation*	
Demographics of New and Continuing Involvements	*Proto*	*Control*	*Proto*	*Control*
Percentage Nonwhite				
Retreads	33	22	26	29
New blood	54	28	55	29
(significance)	(.01)	(.46)	(.01)	(.99)
Percentage Noncollege				
Retreads	48	69	48	67
New blood	53	44	70	52
(significance)	(.58)	(.01)	(.05)	(.36)
Percentage Own Home				
Retreads	76	78	69	81
New blood	64	51	81	76
(significance)	(.06)	(.01)	(.21)	(.72)
Percentage Female				
Retreads	62	67	48	62
New blood	54	56	76	76
(significance)	(.29)	(.24)	(.01)	(.33)
Number of Cases				
Retreads	229	121	42	21
New blood	61	39	33	21

Effectiveness of Participation

Has anything come of beat meetings? In our report on the first year of the program (Skogan et al., 1994), we were fairly critical of the beat meeting process. In important ways what happened there did not fit a community policing model. Meetings that we observed were frequently run by community relations specialists and did not actively involve beat officers. They frequently sat mute in the back, unless called upon. Too often the exchange between residents and the police was one-sided; the former would bring up a long list of specific complaints, and the latter said they would "check on it." Everyone involved still had a narrow, crime-related view of what kinds of problems were suitable for discussion at the meetings, and they all took a traditional, enforcement-oriented view of what appropriate solutions for these problems might look like.

However, our survey respondents took a much more sanguine view of the meetings. If they indicated they had attended a meeting, they were asked a series of questions about what typically happened there (we asked them to typify meetings because they went to an average of 3.8 meetings apiece). Their responses were similar enough across the two districts to combine them. They reported that someone from the community or a community organizer had conducted two thirds of the meetings, and that the police had run only 21% on their own. Seventy percent thought that the meeting itself had been arranged by a community group, 17% thought that police had jointly sponsored the meeting with a group, and only 10% thought police organized the meeting on their own. Fully 86% of those who went to a meeting indicated that they had learned something at the meeting, and 71% reported that action was taken or something happened in their neighborhood as a result of the meeting. When asked how useful these meetings were "for finding solutions to neighborhood problems," 38% said they were very useful, 53% somewhat useful, and only 9% not useful. Half thought the meetings were very useful "for improving the community's relationship with the police," and another 42% thought they were somewhat useful in this regard.

Other Vehicles for Participation

It is important to note that beat meetings are not the only vehicle for public participation in community policing. Another is the civilian advisory committees that have been established in each district. The committees typically involve between 15 and 20 civilians. They are named by the District Commander, and include area residents, local merchants, religious leaders, and representatives of civic associations. We observed all of the advisory committee meetings in the five experimental districts, and can report only that their efforts were highly variable. Participation ranged from highly inclusive to closed and exclusionary. Some committees had close links with beat-level activists, while others were fairly disconnected from events at that level. Some committees focused on broad social issues important to the community but probably beyond the range of the police, while others lavished attention on internal activities like writing extensive bylaws. Some viewed themselves as a support group for their District Commander, while others were viewed by Commanders as contending with them for control of operational policies in the district. No single model of how these committees should function emerged early from this stew.

Community members were also involved at the citywide level, agitating on behalf of the program and pressuring its administrators to hew closely to their commitment to keep the public informed and involved. To date, citywide organizations have been concerned about police performance measures; their

accountability to the public; the extent to which beat teams have actually been freed from responding to 911 calls, and the extent to which they have been able to stay on their beats as planned; and the openness of beat officers to information sharing and cooperation in problem solving. These pressure groups are convinced that the program cannot work unless the community "comes to the table" as a powerful, informed, and competent partner, rather than as a supplicant (Friedman, 1994). To make some progress on this front, one of them organized a series of beat-level training sessions to prepare neighborhood residents to be more effective problem-solving partners.

CONCLUSION

Chicago's new community policing program provided an opportunity to examine a fledgling effort to involve the public in joint police-citizen efforts at preventing crime and responding to neighborhood decay. Structural changes were made in police task organization to facilitate this new model of policing, and the program was linked to the improved management of a broad range of city services. The principal mechanism for coordinating this effort with the public is beat-level public meetings that are to provide police and citizens an opportunity to identify, prioritize, and discuss solutions to a broad range of neighborhood problems.

This chapter examined some aspects of the effort. It found that awareness of the opportunities for participation that the program provided were widespread, and significantly higher in the prototype districts than in the evaluation's comparison areas. Levels of organized participation were not significantly higher in the program areas than in the comparison areas. However, there was some evidence that both awareness and participation were more widely distributed within the prototype areas, perhaps as a result of the uniform nature of the opportunities for participation created by regular and widely publicized beat meetings and extensive efforts by groups and organizations to stimulate participation in the meetings.