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# **PREVENTING CRIME AND DISORDER**

*Targeting Strategies and  
Responsibilities*

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## **PARTNERSHIPS FOR PREVENTION?**

### **Some obstacles to police-community co-operation**

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This chapter examines one aspect of the crime prevention equation: the ability of the police and community members to develop cooperative relationships that focus on problem solving. The data are drawn from an on-going study of the adoption of a community policing model by the City of Chicago (Skogan *et al.*, 1994). While the new model of policing which is being crafted by the Chicago Police Department (CPD) is multi-faceted, at its core lies the (anticipated) formation of police-community partnerships focussed on problem identification and problem solving at the neighbourhood level. The agency's mission statement notes, "... the Department and the rest of the community must establish new ways of actually working together. New methods must be put in place to jointly identify problems, propose solutions, and implement changes. The Department's ultimate goal should be community empowerment." (Chicago Police Department, 1994: 16.) To further this, the CPD has made important structural changes designed to encourage the formation of those partnerships, and has launched a massive training effort to ensure that officers and their immediate supervisors understand the new roles and responsibilities that they are being called upon to adopt.

Beginning in May, 1993, the programme (dubbed 'CAPS' for Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy) has been field tested in five diverse prototype districts. Working empirically, commanders in those districts, senior executives, planners and troubleshooters have been formulating and reformulating the policies and procedures necessary to make community policing a workable concept in Chicago. Rather than forming special units, the CPD is committed to changing its entire organisation. In the districts,

patrol officers are to be divided on a rotating basis into Beat Teams and Rapid Response Teams. Tasks are assigned using formulae which should free up sufficient time for beat officers to work with community members. Other units are being decentralised, so that local commanders have control over various plain-clothes detectives and youth officers and can integrate their efforts with plans being developed at the grassroots level. Representatives of police and civilian employee unions have been included in making many important decisions. Each of the city's police districts are forming civilian advisory committees. Beat meetings (regular gatherings of small groups of residents and beat teams in church basements and school rooms all over the city) are to be the forum for the development of joint police-citizen plans to tackle neighbourhood issues. In recognition that problem-solving policing needs the support of a wide range of agencies, an effort is being made to rationalise the delivery of city services by linking them to service requests generated by beat teams. The overall implementation process is being driven by a Policy and Planning Committee which involves citizens and police planning together to identify challenges that they anticipate facing over a 5-10 year period.

There has been a great deal of progress in the prototype districts. So far, the coordination of city services seems to work: beat officers appear to have the time they need to begin to focus on identifying local problems and resources and to work with neighbourhood residents; after first-round testing with nearly 1,600 officers serving in the prototypes, a full set of curriculum materials has been developed for retraining the entire force; district advisory committees are at work in all five areas, and hundreds of meetings have been held in the prototypes' 54 beats; and the programme has avoided becoming an object of labour-management controversy.

However, in practice the kinds of cultural and behavioral changes that the department's community policing model calls for have been slow to emerge. Officers still often remain on the sidelines at public meetings, not certain about how to deal with citizens except as victims or troublemakers. Both police and citizens still tend to define both problems and preferred responses in traditional enforcement terms. Beat meetings often break down into 'horror story'-telling sessions. Officers still most relish dealing with serious crimes, and the old reward system that is still in place gives more automatic recognition to writing traffic citations than to doing effective problem solving. Beat team members chafe at having been sidelined from the action, and often intentionally leave their beat to be present at 'in progress' calls in nearby areas. This chapter examines some of the obstacles that have impeded organisational change in Chicago and stand in the way of the development of

joint problem-solving efforts.

### PARTNERSHIPS AND THE POLICE

From the police side, one significant obstacle to the formation of partnerships around crime prevention has been the wary scepticism of police officers about their new mission. Community policing is a battle for the 'hearts and minds' of the patrol force. It requires that officers do many of their old jobs in new ways, and that they take on tasks that they never imagined would come their way. They are asked to identify and solve a broader range of problems, reach out to elements of the community that previously fell outside their orbit, and put their careers at risk by taking on unfamiliar and challenging responsibilities. Too often they are asked to do so without enough clarity about how their performance will be evaluated. It is often a battle as police are frequently resistant to change. From their point of view, pessimism is justified. They are cynical about programmes invented at police headquarters, especially by civilians. They are resentful if community members were consulted about the development of new police responsibilities for prevention, but the police on the streets were not. They are cynical about the role of politics in selecting their leaders and shaping their missions. Police are particularly cynical about notions like 'empowerment', the devolution of responsibility, and other modern shopfloor buzzwords. They know that most agencies are typically managed by punishment and fear.

Many of these obstacles to change are operative in Chicago. The department's new community policing programme was imposed from the outside. It is visibly being planned and partly managed by civilians. It was put in place without a change in performance evaluation procedures. And it called for a dramatic increase in citizen input into the setting of priorities for police.

In order to monitor police views on these and related topics we conducted a survey that examined the views of officers before the programme began. During the first half hour of a series of initial day-long orientation training sessions, questionnaires were completed by virtually all of the officers and supervisors that would be serving in the five prototype areas. These sessions were held before members of the organisation knew much about the new programme. The survey probed their perceptions of their jobs, their supervisors, and the communities they served. There were 1,410 respondents. In addition, senior managers of the department completed the same questionnaire about two months later, at a high-level staff briefing on

the programme.

#### Attitudes Toward Their Job

The survey indicated that, to a certain extent, officers were ready for a change. They were unhappy about key aspects of their jobs that might be improved by a well-implemented community policing programme. The survey found that officers were looking for a stimulating and challenging job (86 per cent) that allowed them to exercise independent thought and action (87 per cent); to be creative and imaginative (86 per cent); and to learn new things (89 per cent). However, less than half of those surveyed felt that they had deep personal involvement in their current jobs. Their responses were divided down the middle over whether their jobs actually gave them opportunities for independence and control over how they did their work. Less than one-third thought that the current structure of their job enabled them to see their work through to completion - something they sought. Only about one-quarter agreed that they had any influence over their job, or that their supervisors sought out their opinions. Only about a third felt their supervisors let them know how well they were performing, and one-quarter believed that they could easily communicate their ideas to management.

In addition, the survey found some pre-existing support for the kind of consultative, problem-solving relationship that is supposed to develop under Chicago's new community policing strategy. Figure 9.1 documents responses to a series of questions probing officers' orientations toward consultation and problem solving. It presents the percentage of officers who either "agreed" or "agreed very much" with each statement. A majority of officers surveyed thought that citizens had important information to share about their beat, and that police should be concerned about a range of neighbourhood problems. Larger majorities (67 per cent) endorsed making frequent informal contacts with police, assisting citizens (71 per cent), and working with citizens to solve local problems (74 per cent).

#### Attitudes Toward Community Policing

However, responses to other questions revealed that officers were not very keen on tactics like foot patrol, or in 'marketing' their new services to the public. At the outset, there was not widespread enthusiasm for involving themselves in 'solving non-crime problems'. As Figure 9.1 indicates, only

about 30 per cent thought that it was an appropriate role for the police. Of course, this runs directly counter to the broad problem-solving stance that the department is encouraging them to adopt, and to the important role they play in identifying neighbourhood needs that can be addressed by other municipal agencies. Officers were willing (hypothetically) to devote department resources to community policing, but only in moderate amounts. Most importantly, they did not think that the new programme would have any marked impact on the community. Figure 9.2 illustrates the extent of their pessimism about the potential impact of community policing on the community, which was considerable. Officers were asked whether each of a list of possible outcomes would be "more likely" or "less likely" to occur because of the new programme, or if things would "remain the same". In Figure 9.2, both "less likely" and "neutral" responses are treated as pessimistic. Half of those questioned thought that the programme would not contribute to the resolution of neighbourhood problems, and an almost equal proportion did not think it would lead to the more effective use of crime information. Even more officers (56 per cent) were sceptical that community policing would contribute to a greater willingness of citizens to cooperate with the police. Only about one-third were pessimistic about the impact of community policing on police-community relations, but almost 70 per cent thought it would not improve their relationship with racial minorities in the community.

These rather pessimistic views take on added significance in light of the fact that police were also not very sanguine about the current state of police-community relations. Four questions probing their beliefs about what the public thinks of them are presented in Figure 9.3. They split evenly on the issue of whether they are respected by the public and 57 per cent thought the relationships between the police and the people of Chicago were "not good". Many officers thought they were unappreciated and the difficulty of their work underestimated.

The survey suggests that one concrete reason for their scepticism about community policing was its anticipated impact on 'business as usual' in the Chicago Police Department. The agency traditionally has excluded outsiders from influencing day-to-day operations, and has pursued a reactive, rapid-response strategy that defines battling 'serious crime' as its central goal. Officers were clearly concerned about the impact of adopting community policing on the department's autonomy, and on the nature and volume of work that would come their way as a result. In Figure 9.4, pessimism was indicated if officers thought things were more likely to happen as a result of community policing. As it indicates, 72 per cent of the officers scheduled to

work in the new prototype areas were pessimistic about "unreasonable demands on police by community groups", and 51 per cent about "blurred boundaries between police and citizen authority". Substantial percentages also thought that it was likely that their workload would rise as a result of citizen's demands that they solve problems.

Finally, the survey found that officers were not very sanguine about the ability of the department to manage change. One-quarter thought that management treated its employees well, and even fewer felt that the department was open to change. Only six per cent had confidence that the command staff picks the most qualified candidates for jobs, a view in line with the pervasive role of politics in the department's operations.

#### Division Within The Force

Police were not unanimous in their views about these matters. In fact, they were deeply divided about many of them, along many cleavage lines that divide opinion about the police in the general population. By and large, optimism and support for community policing were more widespread within management ranks than within the patrol force; older officers were much more likely than younger ones to be ready for change; and women were somewhat more supportive of community policing than were men. The deepest divisions, however, were along racial and ethnic lines. White officers were far more satisfied with things the way they are. Whites were more pessimistic about the potential for community policing and the adverse consequences of the effort on their work load and organisational autonomy. They were less likely to think that they were personally qualified to identify problems and devise solutions to them, and they were less willing than others to support diverting department resources toward the programme.

Figures 9.5 and 9.6 illustrate the magnitude of some of these divisions. Figure 9.5 charts levels of pessimism about the impact of community policing on the community according to the race of the officers. It depicts the percentage of officers who thought that the new programme would lead to no change or would make the effective use of crime information less likely, along with the resolution of neighbourhood problems, the willingness of citizens to cooperate with the police, and improved relations between police and racial minorities (the exact wording of these questions was presented above in Figure 9.2). In each case, white officers were much more pessimistic than African-American officers, while Hispanic officers fell in the middle. Seventy-seven per cent of white officers were doubtful that

community policing would improve their relations with minorities.

Figure 9.6 presents responses to the same questions by police of various ranks. The 'supervisor' category includes sergeants and lieutenants, and a few captains. The senior staff category includes survey responses by 68 of the department's most senior managers, including the superintendent. The senior managers were overwhelmingly positive about the official direction that the department was taking, but there was a vast gulf between them and the front-line supervisors that they must rely on to make the programme really work. Supervisors were in turn less pessimistic than members of the patrol force, a majority of whom were sceptical in each case.

Table 9.1 presents a regression analysis examining the joint influence of the factors examined here on multiple-item scales measuring five clusters of police opinion. Regression analysis is useful because many of these factors are related to one another, as well as to attitudes toward community policing. Women officers tend to be younger; supervisors and senior staff members are older, and more likely to be white; and older officers have less education and are less likely to be Hispanic. Regression analysis enables us to identify the relative importance of each of these factors, controlling for their overlap with the others.

Most of the concepts examined in Table 9.1 have been described above. The components of the first column (oriented toward community consultation) were presented in Figure 9.1. The components of the second (optimistic about community impact) were presented in Figure 9.2, and the third (optimistic about impact on autonomy) in Figure 9.3. Officers' perceptions of how capable they were of carrying out community policing tasks (column 4) were measured by asking them "how qualified" they felt they were to identify community problems, analyse them, develop solutions, and evaluate whether the solutions worked. Their willingness to devote resources to community policing (column 5) was assessed by responses to nine questions about foot patrol, crime prevention, working with community groups, etc. In each case officers indicated "how much of the department's resources" should be committed to the activity, in four categories ranging from "none" to "large amount". The measures examined in Table 9.1 were created by adding together responses to their component questions. The components of each measure were single factored, and each scale had a Cronbach's Alpha reliability exceeding 0.60.

The analysis summarised in Table 9.1 documents the persistence of race, age, and rank differences in police views of community policing. The strongest effects (which can be judged by comparing the significant standardised regression coefficients within each column) were reserved for

ethnicity. In almost every instance, minority officers were more supportive than whites of community policing. Being an African-American counted the most, while differences in the views of Hispanics were less pronounced. Rank was also consistently influential, and support was highest at the top of the organisation. Women were more supportive of community policing on only two dimensions: its anticipated impact on the community, and their willingness to devote department resources to the effort. Education does not appear to have much of an effect on attitudes. Interestingly, in each case the coefficients associated with age were *positive* - older officers were more optimistic and willing to support the enterprise. This finding surprised many observers, who assumed that young officers would favour current trends toward broader community participation in governance and would be more amenable to change. Others noted that older officers are generally less aggressive in their policing style, and many have acquired a more modest view of the long run effectiveness of what they have been doing in the past or are simply 'burned out'.

#### Tackling Police Culture

While the battle for the 'hearts and minds' of the patrol force is a difficult one, it might be winnable. There are certainly instances in which a combination of training and on-the-job experience have turned around the views of tradition-laden departments. Research in other cities indicates that officers doing community policing typically think their work is important, interesting and rewarding, and less frustrating. They feel they have more independence and control over their jobs, which are important determinants of job satisfaction. Finally, they tend to take a more benign and trusting view of the public (Lurigio and Rosenbaum, 1994). In New York City, community officers reportedly found they were more exposed to 'the good people' of the community, and that in walking their beats they got to know residents as individuals, and did not just deal with them in crisis situations (McElroy, Cosgrove and Sadd, 1993). In Madison, Wisconsin, officers in an experimental community policing district grew to see themselves working as a team, believed that their efforts were being supported by their supervisors and the department, supported change, and thought that the department was really reforming itself. They were more satisfied with their job and more strongly committed to the organisation than officers serving in other parts of the city. They also were more customer oriented, believed more firmly in the principles of problem solving and community policing,

and felt that they had a better relationship with the community (Wycoff and Skogan, 1994).

Chicago's programme managers have mounted a three-pronged attack on the problem of capturing the support of rank-and-file officers. One is to change their jobs, on the assumption that their views will come to conform with the reality of their day-to-day tasks. Another is to focus on supervision. In the Chicago programme, sergeants are the key management layer, and attention has been paid to their new roles. Finally, the department has invested heavily in training.

Their jobs were changed by dividing the officers serving each district into beat teams and rapid response teams. Beat officers spend a large majority of their time within their assigned geographical area. There they are to work with schools, merchants, and residents to identify and solve problems, and to serve as conduits to expedite requests for services from other city agencies. An important part of their job is to attend neighbourhood meetings and work with existing community organisations on a broad range of issues. Public beat meetings are held in every beat on a monthly or quarterly basis to facilitate communication between residents and beat officers. These, plus district-level advisory committee meetings and consultations with representatives of other municipal service providers, provide a structure which forces them to confront their expanded role definition. Beat teams are beginning to complete Beat Planners which force them to list problems in their area and to identify the community resources that are available to assist them in solving them. Over time, officers alternate between beat work and responding to 911 calls as rapid response officers, to ensure that community policing is not confined to special units within the organisation.

While the structural elements of this plan are in place, at the time of writing, little autonomous problem identification and problem solving is going on, and there are few signs of the formation of police-community partnerships around crime prevention. The police have become noticeably more *responsive* to citizen's concerns through the mechanism of the beat meeting, but everyone's definition of appropriate problems and the terms of that responsiveness has so far been largely traditional and calling mainly for enforcement efforts.

It is clear that the programme will not become a reality until officers believe that their immediate superiors really expect them to carry it out. As a result, reshaping and strengthening the supervisory role of sergeants has taken on new urgency. Sector sergeants oversee beat officers covering three beats, and are responsible for how they spend their tour of duty. As the programme unfolded, it became clear that the role of sector sergeant was not

defined clearly, and that they often felt unsure about what was expected of them. Confusion over their new roles included their responsibility for maintaining officers' beat integrity, coordination of city services, the continuing demand by other parts of the department for success on traditional performance measures (e.g. issuing traffic citations), problems that have arisen in separately dispatching beat and rapid response cars, and their responsibility for rapid response officers in their sectors. Sergeants had repeatedly been told that their job was to coach officers in their new community roles, but in truth, they knew as little as the front line force about exactly what that really entailed. They were disgruntled and felt overworked. Many of these issues, particularly role confusion, were addressed in special supervisor training that was conducted in the spring of 1994, but it is too soon to report on how effective that training has been.

Another route to attitude change is training. Once organisational change processes are set in motion, training is one of the most important ways in which officers can be 'brought on board' and change actually implemented. Even if their hearts have been won over, in the absence of a comprehensive training programme, officers will be forced in their minds to fall back on what they already know. Problem solving will inevitably focus on old, familiar problems, and the strategies that officers choose to deal with them will be those they always have employed: conducting visible patrol, issuing summonses, and making arrests. Officers will be particularly frustrated if they are told by their superiors to do things they do not understand. Hence, the practical information content of training is important. But in addition, community policing calls for autonomous, creative action on the part of officers, so it is also important that they are thoroughly conversant with the underlying values and principles that should guide their action in particular circumstances. Both their minds and their hearts are important.

#### PARTNERSHIPS AND THE PUBLIC

At the other side of the partnership equation lies the public. While in 1994 crime appears to be the number one item on the public's agenda, it turns out that the enthusiasm of many community members for community policing is muted. While many Chicagoans support their efforts (but wish they did a better job), for a large number, the police are another of life's problems rather than a solution to them. To gauge public opinion on the eve of the new programme, survey interviews were conducted with 2,573 residents of the five prototype districts and matched neighbourhoods that serve as

comparison areas for the evaluation. Between them, these programme and control areas include about 60 per cent of the city. The interviews were conducted by telephone, using a combination of listed directory and randomly generated telephone numbers. The survey covered a wide range of issues, ranging from satisfaction with the community to criminal victimisation. It included questions about the quality of police service in the area and contacts that respondents had with police during the year before the interview. The survey found that race, victimisation, and personal experience with the police all formed cleavage lines across which opinions about police service were divided. Some of the most negative opinions were held by those who had contact with the police, victims, and those who had called them for assistance. These cleavages make it particularly difficult for police to form an alliance with community members.

#### Racial Division in Attitudes

Perhaps the most significant obstacle to the formation of police-community partnerships in Chicago is the depth of racial division around policing issues. This cleavage is not new. Surveys conducted by the US Census Bureau during the mid-1970s found that differences between white's and African-American's opinions about the police were greater in Chicago than in any other of 26 major US cities. Our survey conducted in advance of the city's 1993 community policing initiative indicates that those differences were still profound.

Figure 9.7 presents a few illustrative examples. It depicts responses to four questions probing perceptions of the quality of police service in the respondent's communities. They were asked how polite, helpful, and fair police were "... when dealing with people in your neighbourhood", and how concerned the police were "... when dealing with people's problems". Figure 9.7 charts by ethnic background the percentage who felt police were "not very" or "not at all" polite, concerned, helpful, or fair.<sup>1</sup> As it indicates, Hispanics and African-Americans were almost three times as likely as whites to feel that police were typically impolite. Ethnic differences on other dimensions were only somewhat less extreme. About 35 per cent of Hispanics felt police were not concerned about the problems facing people in their neighbourhoods; 25 per cent of African-Americans, but only 15 per cent

<sup>1</sup> Respondents characterised as 'Hispanic' are predominately of Mexican origin.

of whites, also felt this way. Police came off best on the 'fairness' dimension, but even on that dimension Hispanics and African-Americans were more than twice as dissatisfied.

We have seen above that police were most sceptical about the possible impact of community policing on their relationship with minority residents, and that their own racial background was the biggest source of division over this issue. The situation is no different in the community; as a multi-variate analysis presented below documents, race is a source of division among citizens as well.

#### Negative Impact of Contact

A second obstacle to the formation of police-community partnerships in Chicago is that residents who had direct contact with police were more dissatisfied than those who did not. Not surprisingly, survey respondents who were stopped by police while they were driving or on foot were unhappy about police. Figure 9.8 separates out whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics who were the targets of proactive policing efforts during the year before the survey, and compares their views with those who were not the targets of police action. Figure 9.8 is based on average responses to a ten-question scale assessing the perceived quality of police service. This measure includes responses to the four items examined in Figure 9.7, plus questions about how good a job police were doing in relation to a number of specific tasks, how responsive they were to community concerns, and how well they worked with neighbourhood residents and focussed on problems that concerned them. Figure 9.8 indicates where respondents who were on average "neutral" about the police would fall (at 2.5 in a 1-4 range), and the average opinion scores of those who were stopped or not during the past year. There were differences associated with police contact among all three ethnic groups, but only African-Americans and Hispanics who were stopped fell in the negative range.

Interestingly, there were no large differences between these groups in the rate at which they reported being stopped by police. Hispanics and African-Americans were stopped somewhat more often (29 per cent of each group, as compared to 24 per cent for whites). This is about twice the comparable rates for whites and Afro-Caribbeans in England and Wales (Skogan, 1994; 1990). However, almost all of the police-initiated encounters analysed in Figure 9.8 involved traffic stops, an experience that was overwhelmingly concentrated among young males. When age is taken into account, there were

no significant differences in the rate of proactive policing across ethnic groups. (This is unlike England and Wales, where race is more persistently related to the frequency of police-initiated encounters.)

In addition, respondents who themselves had contacted the police also were unhappy about the quality of police service in their community. The contact measure is based on questions about nine typical occasions on which respondents might call police or stop an officer, including to report a crime, suspicious person, or an emergency, or to request, or offer, various kinds of information. Overall, 52 per cent of those interviewed recalled initiating one or more of those encounters during the previous year. This figure is very close to that for inner-city and metropolitan areas of England and Wales. Figure 9.8 depicts differences in assessments of policing associated with having contacted the police. As before, among all three ethnic groups, those who contacted the police during the previous year were more dissatisfied than those who did not do so. In Figure 9.8, differences in average scores associated with citizen-initiated contact appear to be virtually the same as differences associated with police-initiated contact. This is confirmed in a multi-variate analysis presented below, which finds virtually the same, negative, effects of citizen and police-initiated contacts.

As in England and Wales, the frequency of contacts with police that were initiated by the public were unrelated to race. Fifty-three per cent of whites, 52 per cent of African-Americans, and 50 per cent of Hispanics recalled contacting police during the previous year. Why these groups contacted the police varied only slightly. Hispanics were less likely than others to contact them to ask for information or advice, but were more likely to call about suspicious circumstances. However, whites were most likely to contact police to report a crime. Statistically, contacting them to report a crime had a large negative impact on attitudes toward police, so this fact tended to drive down aggregate white opinion about policing.

#### Negative Views of Victims

As this suggests, some of the dissatisfaction associated with contacting the police is related to being a crime victim. Based on their experience, there did not appear to be any particular reason for crime victims in Chicago to be supportive of the police or their efforts. Victims were more dissatisfied than non-victims with the quality of police service in their neighbourhood. This was true both of personal and property crime victims, and, as Figure 9.9 depicts, it was true among the city's major ethnic groups. Non-victims,



including respondents of all races, were, as a group, positive about the police, but the negative effects of victimisation on assessments of police service were substantial.

Of course, all of the factors examined here affect one another as well as opinions of policing. Contacting the police was related to being a crime victim; almost all respondents who had been stopped by the police had also called them about some matter; types of citizen-initiated contacts were related to race; race was slightly related to being stopped by police, through the differential age distribution of various ethnic groups. In order to clarify the independent impact of these factors, Table 9.2 reports the results of a regression analysis of the correlates of the ten-item scale measuring popular assessments of the quality of police service. It divides the explanatory variables into the categories reviewed above: race (contrasting the views of African-Americans and Hispanics against those of whites), victimisation by personal and property crime, citizen and police-initiated contacts with the police, and a list of potentially confounding factors that might account for the apparent link of any of those to attitudes toward police.

As Table 9.2 indicates, race, victimisation, and contact with police were all independently related to assessments of the quality of police service. This was true even when the influence of a number of other important demographic factors were accounted for, including home ownership, age, income, education, length of residence in the neighbourhood, and marital and labour force status. The magnitude of the regression coefficients is shown in the middle column of Table 9.2. The table shows that being African-American or Hispanic, a property or personal crime victim, and having either a police-initiated or self-initiated contact with the police were all separately influential in shaping attitudes in a negative direction. Together, ethnicity was the most important set of factors, and the relative dissatisfaction of African-Americans with the quality of police service in their community was manifest.

### Tackling Mass Opinion

None of these findings is surprising. The British Crime Survey (BCS) has documented the seeming negative effects of both victimisation and encounters with police on attitudes toward the quality of police service. People with direct, personal experience with both crime and the police are more dissatisfied with police service than those who rely on the media for their information about policing (Skogan, 1994; 1990). Surveys that document the

disaffection of racial minorities from the institutions of justice are legion.

Chicago's strategy for dealing with public opinion has naturally focussed on improving the quality of police service. The aim of the prototype areas that were chosen as test sites were diverse and challenging, including some of the highest-crime parts of the city. Two of the areas are overwhelmingly African-American, a third is 60 per cent Hispanic and 40 per cent African-American, one houses working and middle-class white and African-American home owners, and one is diverse across numerous race and class categories. The prototyping strategy is to find tactics that will work - perhaps differently - in these diverse environments. Likewise, the expanded role of police in identifying problems and coordinating intensified municipal services in the prototype areas apparently had paid first year dividends. Agency statistics on clean-ups, abandoned vehicle tows, graffiti removal, and other priority targets are impressive, and our pre-programme survey indicated that residents rated these problems as serious ones in their neighbourhoods.

On the other hand, the CPD has not put any particular emphasis on the quality of what happens during 'traditional' citizen and police-initiated encounters, and, in particular, they have paid no attention to the distinctive dissatisfaction of crime victims. This analysis indicates that these are important sources of dissatisfaction, and unlike many other matters they are directly in the hands of the department itself. More effective handling of victims' problems might ameliorate some of the differences revealed in Figure 9.9. Likewise, police demeanour on the scene doubtless accounts for some of the general dissatisfaction expressed by those stopped by the police (Skogan, 1990). As for contacts with police, reports by evaluation observers at beat meetings (we attended about 150 meetings) attest that complaints about the speed and quality of police response to 911 calls dominated the agenda on many occasions.

On the other hand, efforts are being extended to involve community residents in police policy making. Local organisations, merchants, churches, and community activists are represented on district advisory committees; citizens have the opportunity to make their voices heard at beat meetings; and civilians representing citywide organisations have been involved in high-level planning efforts. Of course, hosting or attending community meetings does not directly address the deepest pockets of dissatisfaction with policing. Participation is inevitably self-selecting. Our survey found that at the outset, before the programme began, about 16 per cent of Chicagoans had attended a meeting during the past year that had featured crime problems or crime prevention. However, those who attended such meetings were more affluent and educated home owners, older, and white. They felt safer and were

already more involved in crime prevention than those who did not attend. They were also more favourable in their views of the police, and they were more likely to think that policing in Chicago was going to improve in the near future. The challenge is to use similar mechanisms to reach out to new members of the community.

Finally, the CPD has engaged in some limited marketing efforts. The Mayor and other city officials speak often about the programme and appear at CAPS-related events. A municipal cable television channel frequently features the programme. The CPD generates newsletters explaining the programme to the public and the force. Our evaluation will document the extent to which these messages reach officers and the general public.

### CONCLUSION

Chicago's new community policing programme provides an opportunity to examine the reality of a fledgling, joint, police-citizen, crime prevention effort. The programme calls for police to become proactive problem seekers, along with their civilian partners. They are to work together to prevent crime, rather than just continuing to respond to an endless stream of seemingly disconnected incidents (Goldstein, 1990). Structural changes have been made in their task organisation that were designed to encourage the adoption of this new mode of policing. Parallel efforts have been made to devise a new training programme informing officers about their new duties, and sergeants are being encouraged to adopt new supervisory roles. The programme has been successfully linked to the improved management of a broad range of city services, and has made a visible impact on some of the problems in the city's five prototype areas during the first year of the experiment. Finally, district-level advisory committees and beat-level public meetings provide police and citizens with an opportunity to identify and discuss both individual problems and general neighbourhood conditions.

This chapter examined some of the obstacles that have stood in the way of the development of joint problem-solving efforts within this framework. It does not appear that the anticipated partnerships for prevention have occurred. On the police side, the cultural and behavioral changes that the department's new policing model calls for have been slow to emerge. Officers are pessimistic about their public image, sceptical about the programme, and worried about its impact on their workload. There is substantial dissatisfaction with the police from the point of view of the public, and two sub-groups - crime victims and those who have contacted the police

for service - are among the most dissatisfied. The programme's managers recognise these problems (in part because of our data collection), and continue to press their agenda. Many people on both sides have adopted a position of 'watchful waiting', and the second year of our evaluation should determine in which directions they eventually move.

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**Table 9.2**  
Regression Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward Police


Variable	Standardised Reg. Coeff.	Significance
Police-initiated contact	<b>-.042</b>	.05
Self-initiated contact	<b>-.043</b>	.05
Personal crime victim	<b>-.120</b>	.00
Property crime victim	<b>-.204</b>	.00
Hispanic	<b>-.108</b>	.00
African-American	<b>-.257</b>	.00
Control factors		
home owner	<b>.051</b>	.03
have a job	-.016	.47
married/cohabiting	.033	.12
female	.012	.57
high school graduate	-.027	.24
years in residence	-.022	.38
income over \$20,000	-.030	.21
age (years)	<b>.206</b>	.00
Number of cases	1965	
R-squared	.23	

NB: Standardised regression coefficients and their significance. Significant coefficients presented in bold.

**Table 9.1**  
Regression Analysis of Police Attitudes Toward Community Policing


	(1) oriented toward community consultation	(2) optimistic about community impact	(3) optimistic about impact on autonomy	(4) personally capable of community policing	(5) devote resources to community policing
Gender (female)	.01 (.76)	<b>.05 (.05)</b>	.05 (.06)	-.03 (.34)	<b>.09 (.00)</b>
Black	<b>.39 (.00)</b>	<b>.29 (.00)</b>	<b>.25 (.00)</b>	<b>.19 (.00)</b>	<b>.38 (.00)</b>
Hispanic	<b>.09 (.00)</b>	<b>.10 (.00)</b>	<b>.04 (.18)</b>	<b>.01 (.72)</b>	<b>.16 (.00)</b>
Rank	<b>.08 (.00)</b>	<b>.08 (.01)</b>	<b>.06 (.07)</b>	<b>.08 (.01)</b>	<b>.02 (.48)</b>
Age	<b>.18 (.00)</b>	<b>.15 (.00)</b>	<b>-.01 (.81)</b>	<b>.06 (.05)</b>	<b>.08 (.01)</b>
Education	<b>-.01 (.81)</b>	<b>-.02 (.41)</b>	<b>.07 (.01)</b>	<b>-.01 (.81)</b>	<b>-.02 (.49)</b>
Number of cases	1229	1214	1214	1202	1219
R-squared	.19	.11	.07	.05	.16


NB: standardised regression coefficients and their significance (in parentheses). Significant coefficients are presented in bold. The coefficients can be compared in magnitude down the columns.




**Figure 9.2**  
Pessimism About CAPS Impact on the Community

**Figure 9.1**  
Orientation Toward Community Involvement





**Figure 9.4**  
Pessimism About CAPS Impact on Police Autonomy



**Figure 9.3**  
Pessimism About the Public's View of Policing




Figure 9.5  
Officer Rank and Pessimism About CAPS Impact






Figure 9.6  
Officer Race and Pessimism About CAPS Impact



**Figure 9.9**  
**Attitudes by Victimization and Race**

